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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brandon Joshua Peaslee appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to commit robbery. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the early morning hours of May 14, 2011, Peaslee and another 
individual, Taylor Wray, attempted to rob a convenience store in Garden City. 
(See generally State's Exhibit 1; Defense Exhibits A, C, E; PSI, pp.2-3.) Peaslee 
drove Wray to the convenience store, provided him with a 12 gauge shotgun, 
and waited in the car while Wray entered the store to commit the robbery. (R., 
pp.134-35; State's Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibit A, pp. 7-9; Defendant's Exhibit 
C; Defendant's Exhibit E, pp.12-19; PSI, pp.2-3.) Wray, wearing a mask and 
gloves, entered the store with the loaded shotgun and demanded money from 
the clerk. (R., pp.134-35; State's Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibit E, p.25; PSI, 
pp.2-3.) When the clerk was unable to open the safe, Wray opened fire, 
shooting at the clerk three times and striking him in the arm. (R., p.135; PSI, 
pp.3-5.) Wray then fled the store and got back into Peaslee's vehicle, and the 
two of them left the scene. (R., p.135; State's Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibit A, 
pp.9-10; Defendant's Exhibit E, pp.12, 19, 23; PSI, p.3.) 
Early in their investigation of the crime, police received a number of tips 
about the identity of the shooting suspect. (R., p.135; Tr., p.46, Ls.3-23.) 
Around noon on May 15, 2011, they interviewed Wray, who confessed to the 
shooting and attempted robbery and identified Peaslee as the driver of the 
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getaway car. (R., p.135; Tr., p.40, Ls.8-16, p.46, L.24- p.47, L.10; PSI, pp.2-3.) 
Later that same day, a Garden City police detective contacted Peaslee by 
telephone at his girlfriend's house in Mountain Home. (R., p.135; Tr., p.41, L.13 
- p.44, L.1.) When the detective told Peaslee that officers would like to meet 
with him in person, Peaslee suggested a meeting at the Mountain Home Police 
Department or Elmore County Sheriff's Office. (R., p.135; Tr., p.42, Ls.13-20, 
p.49, Ls.14-25.) 
Peaslee drove himself to the Elmore County Sheriff's Office. (R., p.135; 
Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.1, p.50, Ls.1-21; Defendant's Exhibit A, p.7.) Once 
there, he was met by two Garden City police officers who pat searched him and 
then escorted him to an interview room inside the building. (R., pp.135-36; Tr., 
p.50, L.22 - p.51, L.25; Defendant's Exhibit A, p.7.) At the outset of the 
interview, which was recorded, one of the officers advised Peaslee that he was 
not under arrest. (R., p.137; Tr., p.18, Ls.4-17; State's Exhibit 1; Defendant's 
Exhibit E, p.4.) The officer then advised Peaslee of his Miranda 1 rights and 
provided Peaslee with a "Notification of Rights" form, which Peaslee signed, 
indicating he understood his rights and wished to speak to the officers. (R., 
p.136; State's Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibit A, p.7; Defendant's Exhibit B, 
Defendant's Exhibit E, pp.4-5.) During the course of the approximately 40-
minute interview that followed, Peaslee answered the officers' questions and, 
ultimately, admitted his involvement in the convenience store robbery. (R., 
pp.136-38; State's Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibits A, E.) At the conclusion of the 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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interview, Peaslee wrote out and signed a confession. (R., p.138; Defendant's 
Exhibit C.) He also consented, both verbally and in writing, to a search of his 
car. (R., p.138; State's Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibit A, p.1 0; Defendant's 
Exhibit D; Defendant's Exhibit E, pp.28-30.) Among the items found in the car 
were two loaded shotguns, ammunition, and a ski mask and gloves. (State's 
Exhibits 2-4; Defendant's Exhibit A, pp.11-12; PSI, p.3.) 
A grand jury indicted Peaslee on one count of conspiracy to commit 
robbery and one count of infliction of great bodily harm during an attempted 
felony or conspiracy. (R., pp.51-54.) Peaslee moved to suppress the 
statements he made to police, contending they were the product of an 
involuntary Miranda waiver. (R., pp.85-87, 91-104.) He also moved to suppress 
the evidence seized from his car, contending his consent to search was 
"irrevocably intertwined with and the result of his unconstitutional interrogation" 
and was otherwise "not freely and voluntarily given." (R., pp.85-87, 104-16.) 
The district court conducted a hearing on the motion and ultimately denied it, 
finding both that Peaslee validly waived his Miranda rights and that he voluntarily 
consented to the search of his vehicle. (R., pp.134-42.) 
Peaslee thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to 
commit robbery, reserving the right to appeal the district court's ruling; the 
remaining charge was dismissed. (R., pp.143-46.) The district court accepted 
Peaslee's plea and imposed a unified sentence of life, with 10 years fixed. (R., 
pp.163-65.) Peaslee timely appeals. (R., pp.167-70.) 
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ISSUES 
Peaslee states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Peaslee's motion to 
suppress statements and evidence in violation of his rights 
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of life, with ten years fixed, upon Mr. 
Peaslee, following his plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit 
robbery, in light of the mitigating factors present in his case? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Must the district court's order denying Peaslee's motion to suppress be 
affirmed because Peaslee failed to carry his burden below of establishing 
he was in custody for purposes of Miranda and, alternatively, has failed on 
appeal to show clear error in the district court's finding that he voluntarily 
waived his Miranda rights? 
2. Has Peaslee failed to demonstrate that the unified sentence of life, with 
10 years fixed, imposed upon his conviction for conspiring to commit 




Peaslee Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Peaslee challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing as he 
did below that the evidence against him - including the statements he made to 
police and the physical evidence obtained from his vehicle - was the product of 
an involuntary Miranda waiver. 2 (Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.) Peaslee's argument 
fails for two independent reasons. First, application of the law to the facts found 
by the district court shows Peaslee was not in custody to a degree associated 
with formal arrest when officers questioned him and, as such, was not entitled to 
the protections of Miranda. Second, even assuming Peaslee was in custody for 
purposes of Miranda, a review of the record supports the district court's finding 
that Peaslee knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 
2 Peaslee contends in both the argument heading and "Introduction" section of 
his appellant's brief that "his statements were coerced and obtained in violation 
of his right to Due Process." (See Appellant's brief, p.5.) He also cites several 
cases standing for the proposition that confessions secured through police 
coercion run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
(Id., p.6.) As even Peaslee appears to recognize on appeal, however, the issue 
below was not whether Peaslee's statements were coerced, but whether 
Peaslee voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before making the statements. 
(Compare R., pp.91-116 and Tr., p.71, L.9 - p.74, L.21 with Appellant's brief, 
pp.7-9.) Ultimately, Peaslee adopts defense counsel's arguments below - i.e. 
that there was never a valid Miranda waiver. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.) To the 
extent this Court construes Peaslee's Appellant's brief as also raising an issue 
regarding the voluntariness of his statements, such issue is not properly before 
this Court because Peaslee did not raise the voluntariness of his statements as a 
basis for suppression in the proceedings below. See, st..9.:., State v. Holland, 135 
Idaho 159, 161-162, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169-1170 (2000) (declining to consider for 
first time on appeal basis for suppression never raised to or decided by district 
court). 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a defendant was subject to custodial interrogation such that 
police were required to provide Miranda warnings presents a mixed question of 
law and fact. State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 854, 11 P.3d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 2000). 
"The trial court's conclusion that a defendant made a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of his Miranda rights will not be disturbed on appeal where it is supported 
by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 297, 1 
P.3d 795, 798 (2000). See also State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 851-52, 26 P.3d 
31, 34-35 (2001); State v. Person, 140 Idaho 934, 937, 104 P.3d 976, 979 (Ct. 
App. 2004); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 267, 47 P.3d 763, 770 (Ct. App. 
2001 ). "At a suppression hearing the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences 
is vested in the trial court." Person, 140 Idaho at 937, 104 P.3d at 979; State v. 
Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 169, 997 P.2d 626, 630 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Nobles, 
122 Idaho 509, 835 P.2d 1320 (Ct. App. 1991). The appellate court views all 
presumptions in favor of the trial court's exercise of that power, and the trial 
court's findings on such matters will be upheld if they are supported by 
substantial evidence. Nobles, 122 Idaho 509, 835 P.2d 1320. 
C. Peaslee Was Not In Custody For Purposes Of Miranda At The Time Of 
The Police Questioning 
To safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court 
held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), that before an 
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individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, the interrogating officers must 
advise the individual of certain rights, including the right to remain silent. There 
is no question that, in this case, the officers' express questioning of Peaslee at 
Elmore County Sheriff's Office about the details of the attempted robbery 
constituted an interrogation. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 
(1980) ("[TJhe term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express 
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the 
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from 
the suspect."). Contrary to Peaslee's assertions below and on appeal, however, 
application of the law to the facts found by the district court shows that Peaslee 
was not in custody for purposes of Miranda during that interrogation.3 
Consequently, the officers were not required to obtain a Miranda waiver before 
initiating their questioning and obtaining Peaslee's admissions. 
The test for determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes 
of Miranda is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the interrogation, there was a '"formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 
movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 
463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 
3 The district court did not address the state's argument below that Peaslee was 
not in custody for purposes of Miranda and instead denied Peaslee's 
suppression motion on the basis that Peaslee validly waived his Miranda rights. 
(See R., pp.134-41.) The state agrees with the district court's ruling, see Section 
I.D., infra, but offers the custody argument as an alternative basis on which this 
Court may affirm the district court's order denying Peaslee's motion to suppress. 
See, ~. State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) 
(where lower court reaches correct result by different theory, appellate court will 
affirm on correct theory). 
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U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)); State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 576-77, 
225P.3d 1169, 1171-72 (2010). The standard for determining when Miranda 
warnings are required does not depend on the subjective belief of the suspect or 
officer. Rather, when applying this test, the relevant inquiry is how a reasonable 
person in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. Berkemer 
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984); James, 148 Idaho at 577, 225 P.3d at 
1172; State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 523, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002); State v. 
Albaugh, 133 Idaho 587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999). Factors to be 
considered by the court include the time and location of the interrogation, the 
conduct of the officers, the nature and manner of the questioning, and the 
presence of other persons. State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 
1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992); Albaugh, 138 Idaho at 591, 990 P.2d at 757. 
Although the location of the questioning is one factor to consider, a 
person is not in custody for purposes of Miranda merely "because the 
questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person 
is one whom the police suspect." Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (1977), quoted in 
State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 577, 634 P.2d 435, 439 (1981). Ultimately, it is 
the defendant's burden to demonstrate from "all of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation" that a reasonable person in his position would 
have believed he was in police custody of a degree associated with a formal 
arrest. James, 148 Idaho at 577, 225 P.3d at 1172. 
Applying these principles in State v. Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 536, 976 P.2d 
462 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court rejected Kuzmichev's argument that 
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officers were required to administer Miranda warnings before questioning him at 
a police station regarding his wife's murder. According to the Court, "Kuzmichev 
was a suspect in the case when the interview took place," "the interview was 
conducted in a small room" in the police annex, and "[tJhe purpose of the 
questioning was to elicit incriminating statements." lsi. at 543, 976 P.2d at 469. 
Although police arrested Kuzmichev at the conclusion of the interview, the Court 
upheld the district court's determination that, until he was arrested, Kuzmichev 
was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. lsi_ at 538-39, 543, 976 P.2d at 464-
65, 469. Important to the Court's analysis were the facts that Kuzmichev initiated 
the police contact and drove himself to the police annex; "[h]e was not 
handcuffed nor was his freedom to leave restricted until his was arrested"; he 
had a "sufficient grasp of the English language to ask and answer questions 
appropriately"; and the interview started out relatively cordial, although it "did 
become confrontive and hostile after some time had passed." lsi_ at 543, 976 
P.2d at 469. 
A review of the facts in this case, considered in light of the correct legal 
standards, including those articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Kuzmichev, 
shows that Peaslee failed to meet his burden in the district court of establishing 
he was in custody to a degree associated with formal arrest while being 
questioned at the sheriff's office. Although Peaslee did not initiate the police 
contact, he did suggest the sheriff's office as the location of the meeting place 
and drove himself to the police interview. (R., p.135.) Upon his arrival, officers 
pat searched him for weapons and then "thanked him for meeting them, chatted 
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with him about his girlfriend and whether he lived in Mountain Home and went 
into the building with him." (R., p.135.) While waiting for an interview room, one 
of the officers confirmed with an unidentified woman (presumably an employee 
of the Elmore County Sheriff's Office) that Peaslee was "not in custody" and was 
"just there for questioning." (R., pp.135-36.) Once in the interview room, officers 
advised Peaslee that he was not under arrest. (R., p.136.) They then presented 
Peaslee with, and read aloud from, a "Notification of Rights" form. (R., p.136.) 
Peaslee - whose first language is English, who is a high school graduate and 
who was 19 years old at the time of questioning initialed and signed the form 
and then spoke to the officers. (R., pp.136-38.) The entire interview lasted only 
41 minutes. (R., p.138.) During that time, Peaslee was not handcuffed, nor was 
he ever threatened by the officers. (R., p.137.) The tone of the interview was 
"serious" but "not overbearing or aggressive." (R., p.137.) It was only "after quite 
awhile" that officers questioned Peaslee's rendition of events and "press(ed)" him 
to tell the truth. (R., pp.137-38.) 
Viewed in their totality, the foregoing undisputed facts show that, until he 
was arrested at the conclusion of the police interview, Peaslee was not in 
custody for purposes of Miranda. Like the defendant in Kuzmichev, supra, 
Peaslee voluntarily went to the sheriff's office for questioning. He was informed 
at the outset that he was not in custody or under formal arrest, was never 
threatened by the officers and, also like Kuzmichev, was not handcuffed or 
otherwise restrained. As in Kuzmichev, the interview in this case started out 
cordially and only became confrontational - although not aggressively so - after 
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some time had passed. Considering all of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation, a reasonable man in Peaslee's situation would not have believed 
he was in police custody of the degree associated with a formal arrest. 
Peaslee failed to meet his burden in the district court of establishing that 
he was in custody for purposes of Miranda. Having failed to show that he was 
subject to custodial interrogation triggering the protections of Miranda, Peaslee 
has failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court's order denying his 
motion to suppress. 
D. The District Court's Finding That Peaslee Knowingly And Voluntarily 
Waived His Miranda Rights Is Supported By Substantial And Competent 
Evidence 
Before it can introduce statements made by a defendant in response to a 
custodial interrogation, the state must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights as to self-
incrimination and counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); State v. 
Person, 140 Idaho 934, 937, 104 P.3d 976, 979 (Ct App. 2004) (citing State v. 
Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 297, 1 P.3d 795, 798 (2000)); State v. Nguyen, 122 Idaho 
151, 153, 832 P.2d 324, 326 (Ct. App. 1992). "Whether a defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived his or her Miranda rights is measured by reviewing the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver." Person, 140 Idaho at 937, 
104 P.3d at 979 (citing State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 169, 997 P.2d 626, 630 
(Ct. App. 2000)). "The underlying purpose of this standard is to determine 
whether the defendant's will was overborne." Person, 140 Idaho at 937, 104 
11 
P.3d at 979 (citing State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187,191,998 P.2d 80, 84 
(2000)). 
Although an express written statement waiving Miranda rights is strong 
proof of a voluntary waiver, State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 
(2001 ), neither an express waiver nor a written waiver is required, State v. 
Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 132, 44 P.3d 1180, 1187 (Ct. App. 2002); see also 
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382 (2010) ("Although Miranda imposes 
on the police a rule that is both formalistic and practical when it prevents them 
from interrogating suspects without first providing them with a Miranda warning, it 
does not impose a formalistic waiver procedure that a suspect must follow to 
relinquish those rights." (internal citation omitted)). Rather, as explained by the 
United States Supreme Court: 
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain 
silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity 
of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to 
establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather 
whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the 
rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was unequivocally said in 
Miranda, mere silence is not enough. That does not mean that the 
defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights 
and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a 
conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights. The courts must 
presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the 
prosecution's burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver 
can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person 
interrogated. 
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (emphasis added). See also 
Butcher, 137 Idaho at 132, 44 P.3d at 1187 (citing State v. Brennan, 123 Idaho 
553, 557-58, 850 P.2d 202, 206-07 (Ct. App. 1993)) ("Miranda does not require a 
written or express waiver."). "[A] suspect who has received and understood the 
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Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to 
remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police." Berghuis, 560 
U.S. at 384. 
As Peaslee all but concedes on appeal (see Appellant's brief, pp.8-9), the 
record in this case supports the district court's determination that Peaslee 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. As found by the district 
court, officers advised Peaslee of his Miranda rights at the outset of the interview 
and also gave him a written "Notification of Rights" form. (R., p.136; State's 
Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibit A, p.7; Defendant's Exhibit B; Defendant's Exhibit 
E, p.4.) Peaslee "read the form, initialed each box, and signed the form," 
thereby indicating, in accordance with the last sentence of the form: "I 
understand these rights, and having them in mind, I wish to talk to the officer[s] 
now." (R., p.136; Defendant's Exhibit B.) During the 41-minute interview that 
followed, Peaslee did not invoke his rights to counsel or silence. (R., pp.136-39; 
State's Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibits A, E.) Instead, he spoke to the officers 
about his involvement with Taylor Wray and about his own participation in the 
attempted robbery of the convenience store. (Id.) The officers never threatened 
Peaslee nor made any promises to him, and Peaslee never told the officers that 
he did not want to talk to them. (Id.) When subsequently questioned at the 
suppression hearing about his understanding of his rights as set forth in the 
"Notification of Rights" form and explained to him by the officers, Peaslee 
candidly acknowledged, as he does on appeal, that: 
[H]e knew [he] had the right to remain silent; if he would have told 
officers he did not want to talk, the interrogation would have been 
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over; if he would have asked for an attorney, one would have been 
appointed before any further questions were asked; he had a 
constitutional right to stop answering questions; and he did not say 
anything to the officers to convey that he did not wish to speak with 
them. 
(Appellant's brief, p.9 (citing Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.31, L.10); see also R., pp.136-37 
(district court's findings regarding Peaslee's testimony).) Viewed in their totality, 
these circumstances support the district court's finding that Peaslee understood 
his Miranda rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights by talking to 
the officers. 
On appeal, Peaslee concedes that he received and understood his 
Miranda rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) He contends, however, that the 
officers' failure to have expressly asked him whether he wished to waive his 
Miranda rights precludes a finding of a knowing and voluntary waiver. (Id., p.9 
(adopting defense counsel's arguments below).) Peaslee's argument is without 
merit. Although "Miranda rights must be received and understood before there 
can be a valid waiver," Butcher, 137 Idaho at 132, 44 P.3d at 1187 (citations 
omitted), there is no requirement that the officer expressly ask whether the 
defendant wishes to waive his or her rights before a waiver can occur. Rather, 
where, as here, the record indicates that the defendant understood his or her 
Miranda rights, and the defendant chose to speak to the officer instead of 
invoking his or her right to silence or counsel, a knowing and voluntary waiver 
can be inferred. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382-84; Butcher, 137 Idaho at 132, 44 
P.3d at 1187. 
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The evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that 
Peaslee received and understood his Miranda rights and thereafter voluntarily 
spoke to the officers. From this evidence, the district court correctly concluded 
that Peaslee knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Peaslee has 
failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress the statements and 
physical evidence obtained after his valid Miranda waiver. 
II. 
Peaslee Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of The District Court's 
Sentencing Discretion 
A Introduction 
Peaslee argues the unified sentence of life with 10 years fixed, imposed 
upon his conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery, is excessive and 
unnecessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-14.) 
The record, however, supports the sentence imposed; Peaslee has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. ls;L. 
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C. Peaslee Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any 
Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576,577, 38 P.3d 614,615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the 
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. ~ Although Peaslee argues otherwise, 
he cannot meet his burden of establishing his sentence is unreasonable in light 
of the facts of this case. 
Peaslee conspired with Taylor Wray to commit an armed robbery of a 
Jackson's convenience store. (PSI, pp.2-3, 5.) Peaslee drove Wray to the store 
and gave him a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition with which to accomplish the 
robbery. (PSI, pp.3, 5.) When Wray loaded the shotgun it jammed, so Peaslee 
"field stripped" the weapon to clear the jam and make the weapon operable. 
(PSI, pp.3, 5.) Peaslee then waited in the car while Wray entered the store to 
commit the robbery. (PSI, pp.3, 5.) Inside the store, Wray demanded money 
from the store clerk, Larry Hammen. (PSI, pp.3-4.) When Mr. Hammen was 
unable to comply, Wray shot him in the arm and fired two more rounds, 
apparently for good measure. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Peaslee, who was still waiting in his 
vehicle for Wray to return, "heard 3 'plink' sounds which (he] knew [were] gun 
shots." (PSI, p.5.) Peaslee later claimed to be unaware that Wray shot the store 
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clerk. (PSI, p.5.) Assuming the truth of that claim, Peaslee's ignorance was 
certainly willful; he never entered the store to check on the welfare of anyone 
inside after he heard the gunshots and instead fled from the scene as soon as 
Wray got back in his vehicle. (PSI, pp.3, 5.) 
After the attempted robbery and shooting, Peaslee left the Boise area. 
(PSI, p.3.) When police tracked him down in Mountain Home, he voluntarily 
submitted to an interview but was less than forthcoming during a good portion of 
the questioning. (PSI, p.3; Tr., p.129, L.19 - p.130, L.23; State's Exhibit 1; 
Defendant's Exhibits A, E.) After he finally admitted his involvement in the crime, 
police searched his vehicle and found two loaded, fire-ready sawed off shotguns, 
ammunition, a ski mask and gloves, and a number of burglary tools. (PSI, p.3; 
Tr., p.120, L.20 - p.126, L.3, p.139, L.14 - p.140, L.6; State's Exhibits 2, 3, 
Defendant's Exhibit A, pp.11-12.) They also found a bag of "Dewalt" tools that 
had been stolen from another person's vehicle approximately two weeks earlier. 
(PSI, p.3; Tr., p.132, L.7 - p.139, L.13; State's Exhibits 3-5; Defendant's Exhibit 
A, pp.11-12.) Although it does not appear from the record that Peaslee or Wray 
were ever definitively identified as the individuals who stole the "Dewalt" tools, 
Wray did indicate in his own presentence report that, two weeks before they 
attempted to rob the convenience store, he and Peaslee had "jockey boxed" 
some vehicles. (PSI, p.6.) 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court specifically 
considered the goals of sentencing, placing paramount importance on the need 
to protect society. (Tr., p.190, Ls.5-12.) The court emphasized the egregious 
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and senseless nature of the crime and the fact that, as a consequence of 
Peaslee's decision to participate in the robbery, Mr. Hammen is permanently 
disabled. (Tr., p.189, L.2 - p.190, L.4.) The court reasoned that a penalty was 
justified, not only to punish Peaslee's "deliberate wrongful conduct," but also to 
deter Peaslee and others from engaging in further "wrongdoing." (Tr., p.190, 
L.13 - p.191, L.4.) The court also recognized the importance of rehabilitation but 
ultimately determined that, in Peaslee's case, rehabilitation did not "trump" the 
other sentencing factors. (Tr., p.191, Ls.4-18, p.199, Ls.9-16.) 
In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized a number of factors that 
Peaslee claims are mitigating - including his young age, his lack of any prior 
criminal record, his "good background," and his "supportive and loving family." 
(Tr., p.192, L.11 - p.193, L.5, p.200, Ls.6-11.) The court, however, contrasted 
those mitigating factors not only with the nature of the crime, but also with what it 
characterized as the "more dramatic and aggressive persona" Peaslee had 
clearly adopted and chosen to present to his peers. (Tr., p.193, L.6 - p.194, 
L.13, p.196, L.22 - p.197, L.21.) By way of example, the court noted that, on his 
Facebook page, Peaslee "show[edJ some swagger, show[ed] a focus on guns, 
[and] talk[ed] too readily about shooting others." (Tr., p.193, Ls.20-24.) The 
court also found it concerning that, consistent with his aggressive persona, 
Peaslee actually had in his possession "two loaded weapons, one of which [was] 
really in quite a dangerous condition at the time the vehicle [was] searched"; that 
he was initially dishonest and then continued to "substantially minimize[] his 
involvement and his thinking about the events"; and, most concerning of all, that 
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when faced with the choice of participating in the attempted robbery, Peaslee 
made a series of decisions - including supplying Wray with a loaded shotgun 
and field stripping the gun to make sure it was operable - that directly resulted in 
Mr. Hammen's injuries. (Tr., p.194, L.14 - p.196, L.21.) The court reasoned: 
This crime comes about because of the persona that Mr. 
Peaslee has decided to adopt after he goes out on his own. And 
that's the person who's involved in stealing, and that's the person 
who willingly becomes the getaway driver and drives the 
perpetrator to an armed robbery. 
That shows a thinking pattern that presents a real risk to 
society and to others. The thinking pattern that I see revealed in 
the few statements that are genuinely revealing is a serious 
pattern. 
(Tr., p.197, Ls.11-21.) Considering all the information before it, the court 
reasonably determined that, on balance, a unified sentence of life with 10 years 
fixed was necessary to protect society. (Tr., p.197, L.22 - p.201, L.14.) 
In an attempt to show an abuse of sentencing discretion, Peaslee 
continues to minimize his role in the crime, claiming he "did not pull the trigger on 
the night of the offense," was not aware "Wray would escalate the robbery by 
shooting the clerk," and was not aware, even after hearing the gunshots, that 
Wray shot the clerk. (Appellant's brief, p.11.) As noted above, the district court 
specifically considered these claims at sentencing and found them disingenuous. 
While Peaslee may not have pulled the trigger, he was surely aware when he 
supplied Wray with a shotgun and ammunition that there was a possibility Wray 
would use the gun in the commission of the robbery. In fact, it was Peaslee 
himself who field stripped the shotgun, thereby making sure it was operable 
before Wray entered the convenience store. Upon hearing the gunshots, 
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Peaslee did not rush to the store clerk's aid, call the police or otherwise attempt 
to mitigate the damage that had already been done. Instead, he waited for Wray 
and facilitated his escape by driving him away the scene. To suggest, as does 
Peaslee, that his role in the crime was anything less than significant ignores both 
the record and the district court's findings of fact. 
As further support for his claim that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion, Peaslee points to his Axis II diagnoses of Avoidant Personality 
Disorder and Dependent Personality Disorder, as well as to the psychological 
evaluator's opinion that Peaslee poses a "very low" risk to commit a violent act in 
the future. (Appellant's brief, p.12.) As aptly pointed out by the prosecutor 
below, however, the evaluator's diagnoses and risk assessment are of relatively 
limited utility in determining an appropriate sentence for at least two reasons. 
First, even assuming Peaslee participated in the crime due in part to his 
personality disorders, "those are things that can't be treated" because "[t]hey are 
personality traits," not diagnosable and treatable mental health conditions. (Tr., 
p.142, L. 17 - p.143, L.2.) Second, the evaluator based her opinion that Peaslee 
poses a low risk on the fact that Peaslee has no mental health or substance 
abuse issues but, "even with all of that, he still committed this crime, so there 
isn't really a good explanation as to how he is not going to be a risk in the future" 
(Tr. , p. 1 5 0, L. 1 5 - p. 1 51 , L. 5). 
Finally, Peaslee suggests the district court failed to adequately consider 
his "tremendous support system" and the fact that he expressed remorse and 
"accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) The 
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district court considered all of this information. That the court did not elevate 
Peaslee's support system, expressions of remorse and purported acceptance of 
responsibility above the need to protect society and impress upon Peaslee and 
others the seriousness of the crime does not show an abuse of discretion. 
Again, as stated by the prosecutor below, Peaslee "had the same support 
system, the same level of values, and the same knowledge that he has today as 
he did prior to committing this crime," yet "he still did what he did." (Tr., p.149, 
Ls.11-20.) While Peaslee is undoubtedly remorseful and probably even 
sincerely so - he did not take any action either to prevent the robbery and 
shooting or to render aid to Mr. Hammen. Quite the contrary, Peaslee facilitated 
the robbery, the shooting and Wray's escape and then fled the area in what 
appears to have been an attempt to avoid police detection. 
The district court considered all the relevant information and imposed a 
reasonable sentence. Peaslee has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentence entered upon Peaslee's conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to commit 
robbery. 
DATED this 1st day of July 2013. 
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